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Abstract
In 1990 the South Coast Air Quality Management District cre-
ated a tradable emissions program to more efficiently manage the ex-
tremely bad emissions in the Los Angeles basin. The program created
136 different assets that an environmental engineer could use to cover
emissions in place of installing expensive abatement equipment. Stan-
dard markets could not deal with this complexity and little trading
occurred. A new combinatorial market was created in response and
operated successfully for many years. That market design, called ACE
(approximate competitive equilibrium), is described in detail and its
successful performance in practice is analyzed.
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1 Intro
At the time of the Clean Air Act of 1990, the Los Angeles basin was the only
region in the country classified as an extreme non-attainment area for exceed-
ing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. Under pressure
at the national level from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
at the state level from the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to signif-
icantly reduce emissions, the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) launched a program for trading permits in Nitrogen and Sulfur
Oxides (NOx and SOx) in the Los Angeles basin. That program was strongly
supported by environmental groups and large firms in the LA basin as the
most cost effective way of attaining the desired reductions. This program,
the REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), was initialized in
October of 1993 and has been operating since early 1994.1
The design of the tradable instruments was inevitably a compromise be-
tween regulatory interests and market efficiency. Regulators wanted to be
able to control the timing and distribution of emissions as finely as possible
with caps at many different locations and for many different time periods.
To create liquidity, market designers wanted as few instruments as possible
- a single aggregate cap would have been their preference. In the end, 136
different types of permits were created that could be used by a company to
cover their emissions and, thereby, avoid the costs of abatement. This meant
there were both substitutes and complements among the permits. Further,
the markets for each of these permits would be illiquid. That created a big
problem for the environmental engineers trying to choose between installing
expensive abatement equipment or buying a portfolio of permits.
1Our description of RECLAIM in this subsection is taken liberally from Cason and
Gangadharan (1998). See also Fine (2001), and Carlson, et al. (1993) for more information.
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At the request of a number of firms, a new combinatoric market design
was built and operated to help then and others deal with the complexities
that the RECLAIM program created. In this paper, we provide a description
and analysis of that market. There are three parts. In the rest of this section,
we provide more of the details of the RECLAIM program and describe the
problems that created for environmental engineers. In Section 2, we describe
the ACE-RECLAIM market design with special emphasis in Section 3 on
the algorithms that drove the market. Finally, in Section 4 we look at the
performance of that market.
1.1 The RECLAIM program
RECLAIM is targeted at two major pollutants emitted from stationary sources:
Nitrogen Oxides(NOx) and Sulfur Oxides(SOx). All facilities emitting 4 tons
or more (per year) of NOx or SOx from permitted equipment were included
in RECLAIM. Approximately 390 facilities were in the early NOx market,
which collectively represented about 65 percent of the reported NOx emis-
sions from all permitted stationary sources in the Basin. The SOx market
consisted of 41 facilities, which represented about 85 percent of the reported
SOx emissions from all permitted stationary sources.
Each facility in RECLAIM was allocated a certain number of RECLAIM
Trading Credits (henceforth RTCs or simply permits) for equipment or pro-
cesses that emit NOx or SOx. This allocation depended on the peak activity
levels for each type of permitted equipment between 1989 and 1992. Each
facility received an allocation for each year2 between 1994 and 2000 based on
a straight line rate of reduction calculated from the starting allocation to the
allocation in the year 2000. For the years 2001 to 2003, the allocation levels
were decreased further. Allocations for each year from 2004 to 2010 were
2A permit for 1998, for example, could only be used to cover emissions in 1998.
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to be equal to the 2003 allocation unless the AQMD decided that further
reductions would be required. Average annual percentage reduction rates for
facilities ranged between 7.1 and 8.7 percent in the NOx market and between
4.1 and 9.2 percent in the SOx market (SCAQMD 1993). There is no bank-
ing allowed. At this point in the design there were 2x17 = 34 different types
of permits to deal with. But more were yet to come.
Based on solid experimental evidence, the SCAQMD realized that this
structure of permits would lead to extreme price volatility towards the end
of each year. In a good business year, the need for permits by all firms would
be high and at the end of the year prices could climb to as high as the fine
for emitting too much. In a bad business year, the need for permits by all
firms could be low and at the end of the year prices would drop, perhaps as
low as zero. This price volatility would wreak havoc with rational planning
efforts. To eliminate this problem, the SCAQMD adopted “cycles”. Permits
were identified by year and by cycle. There were 2 cycles; one beginning Jan
1 and one beginning July 1. As an example, 1994 cycle 1 permits could only
be used to cover pollution emitted from Jan 1 1994 to Dec 31 1994. 1994
cycle 2 permits could only be used to cover pollution emitted from July 1
1994 to June 30 1995. It was shown experimentally that such an overlapping
structure of permits would serve to mitigate the extreme price volatility. In
the end it was decided to accept a little more complexity in the number of
types of permits for the reduced complexity due to excessive volatility. There
were now 2x34 = 68 different types of permits. And yet more to come.
Due to regulatory worries about maintaining tight control over the dis-
tribution of pollution by the prevailing on-shore winds, the SCAQMD also
identified permits by zones. The idea was that upwind zones could sell their
permits to downwind zones but not vice versa. The SCAQMD originally
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wanted 37 zones. But, because the economists warned about serious com-
plexities and thinness in trading, they settled for 2: an inland zone and a
coastal zone. Firms located in a coastal zone could only use permits identi-
fied as coastal. Inland firms could use either coastal or inland permits. In
the end, therefore, for perfectly good regulatory considerations, there were a
total of 136 different assets (68 per pollutant) that could be used to cover a
firm’s pollution: 2 pollutants (NOx and SOx), 2 zones (inland and coastal),
2 cycles, and 17 years (1994-2010).
Put yourself in the position of an environmental engineer dealing with
the complexities of the RECLAIM program. A typical exercise would have
the engineer deciding between installing abatement equipment or buying per-
mits. Suppose abatement equipment costs $B to install and has a lifetime of
T periods.3 The equipment abates et units of emissions in period t. As an
alternative, the engineer can cover the same emissions x by using some col-
lection of the 136 permits. We let akt be the amount of permit of type k that
can be used to cover one unit of emissions in t. For RECLAIM, akt ∈ {0, 1}.
Suppose the engineer already has a portfolio of permits, w ∈ <K+ . To avoid
installing the abatement equipment she will have to buy a vector of permits
y ∈ <K+ such that yk + wk =
∑
t zkt and
∑
k aktzkt ≥ et where zkt is the
amount of permit k she will use to cover xt.
If there is an active market for each of the 136 permits and a stable price
3A period can be a year, a quarter, a half-year, etc. For purposes of this example, it
doesn’t really matter.
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of pk for each, she has a fairly easy decision. Let
P = min
y,z
∑
k
pkyk
subject to
yk + wk =
∑
t
zkt,∀k, (1)∑
k
aktzkt ≥ xt,∀t.
yk + wk ≥ 0,∀k
The last constraint eliminates short sales. (1) is a straight-forward linear
programming problem which is easy to solve. She installs the abatement
equipment if and only if $B − pw ≤ P. If P < $B − pw, she buys the vector
of permits y∗ that solves (1).
But such thick markets never existed. As noted by Cason and and Gan-
gadharan (1998), the program placed minimal restrictions on how permits
could be traded. Although the SCAQMD originally planned on putting out
contracts for the design and management of a market system, brokers lobbied
hard and succeeded in preventing that. Brokers suggested, without much real
evidence, that traders could rely on brokers to help bring buyers and sellers
together. RECLAIM brokers would thus bear the search costs for potential
traders, of course for a fee.
Instead of leaving the market entirely to brokers, however, SCAQMD
planners implemented an electronic bulletin board system (BBS) to help
RECLAIM participants find trading partners and reduce search costs. The
BBS was operated by SCAQMD, and anyone could obtain a password to
access their computerized network. The BBS allowed firms to indicate trad-
ing interest by electronically posting offers to buy or sell RTCs. Other firms
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could then scroll through these offers and contact the offering firm to nego-
tiate a transaction. Prices were not posted.
It turned out, however, this was not enough to enable firms to manage
their environmental requirements.
1.2 The Environmental Engineer’s Problem
She must identify and pursue a sequence of deals from the SCAQMD bulletin
board: buying permits of type k without knowing for sure what price she will
be able to negotiate for permits of type, say, k′. And she has to make the
decision now. A simple toy example illustrates the complications and risks
this type of thin market causes.
Example 1 (Permits as complements: the need for AND bids)
There are 2 markets: one for A and one for B. Bidder 1 is our engineer
who needs to buy both A and B. Bidder 2 is only in market A. Bidders 3 and
4 are only in market B. The amounts they want to buy or sell and their true
values for that transaction are in the following table.
Bidder $ Amount of A Amount of B
1 400 50 50
2 - 50 - 50
3 - 180 - 30
4 - 120 - 20
It is important to remember, for this and other examples, that each bidder
knows only her own $ value and does not know those of the others.
If Bidder 1 has to participate separately in market A and market B, she
has to decide what her separate bids in A and B will be. Suppose she assumes
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prices will be similar in the 2 markets and decides to bid 200 for 50 units in
each (or 4 per unit). Having done that, suppose she buys her 50 units of A
for 3 per unit or 150 total. So far so good. Now she must go into the market
for B. She has 2 options. If she is unable to complete a trade for B, resell
the A she bought and pay 400 to abate. Suppose she takes a loss from that of
L. The cost of this outcome is 5 + L
50
per unit. That is how much she is now
willing to bid for B. But 3 and 4 are only willing to sell at a price greater
than 6. If L > 50 she will pay something more than 6 for B. She will not
have to abate (the socially desirable outcome) but will have paid more than
400 for the permits. This is not a good outcome. If L < 50 she will sell the
50 A and abate (the socially undesired outcome). She will also take a loss of
L and therefore will have paid more than 400. This is not a good outcome.
So, no matter what she does at this point she loses. Whatever the ultimate
price of B, she paid too much for A.
She could have tried to negotiate harder when she bought A but if seller
2’s willingness-to-accept had been 5 and seller 4 and 5 had a willingness-to-
accept of 2, this would lead her to not buying A initially. After buying B
she could go back to seller 2, but he might have completed another deal with
someone else. No matter how she plays it she may end up not buying permits,
which is the undesired outcome.
This is certainly a contrived example but imagine trying to string together
trades for 15 different assets in 15 different markets. The example illustrates
the exposure problem4 that the environmental engineer faces when she must
deal in separate markets for each type of permit or engage in a sequence of
separate, complex multi-lateral negotiations. A permits and B permits are
complements, like left and right shoes. Getting one without the other is no
4The exposure problem was identified and discussed at some length in by Bykowsky,
Cull and Ledyard in 1995. The published version is Bykowsky et. al. (2000).
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help. A buyer who has to deal in separate markets for A and B is exposed
to the risk of incomplete transactions. To protect for this she may either bid
lower than she really would be willing to or she may not participate at all.
This destroys potential gains from trade and reduces trade below that which
would be optimal.
Example 2 (Swaps and Endowments: the need for OR bids)
Continuing Example 1, suppose Bidder 1’s company had an initial alloca-
tion of permits from the SCAQMD and is willing to commit some of them to
this project. Suppose she has 60 of A and 40 of B.5 If she is going to use per-
mits instead of abatement equipment, she will have to buy the following stream
of permits: (−10, 10). As in Example 1, she has a problem in deciding how
much to offer in market A and how much to bid in market B. This is a swap
she is willing to enter into if and only if −10pA + 10pb ≤ 400− 60pA − 40pb
or 50pA + 50pB ≤ 400. What she would like to do is to enter a deal to “sell
10 A and buy 10 B if 50pA + 50pB ≤ 400” OR “sell 60 A and 40 B if
50pA + 50pB > 400” but not both. But the thin market won’t allow such
deals. Instead she must negotiate separately for A and B. Suppose when she
goes to the A market, the price for A is $4.50 and, believing that the price of
B will be equal or greater than that, she sells her 60 permits. Then suppose
that when she gets to the B market she learns the price for B is $1.50. She
will have to complete her sale of the 40 B at that price and install abatement
equipment, paying out 400− 270− 60 = 70. If, instead, she had only sold 10
A at the price of $5 and bought 10 B at the price of $1.50, she would have
made $30. The difference is $100. And she may be the least cost abater,
which makes this bad not only for her but also for society.
When markets are thick and prices are stable, buyers and sellers with
5This is as if A are permits for 1995 and B are permits for 1996 and the firm is given
a declining initial allocation.
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complex needs are no more at risk than buyers and sellers with simple needs.
But when markets are thin and prices are unpredictable, buyers and sellers
with complex needs are at risk. Gangadharan (2000) has estimated that
these problems were particularly bad in the early years of the RECLAIM
program. The program consists of firms with very different industrial struc-
tures, which use different technologies to produce very heterogeneous prod-
ucts which means that matching a single buyer with a single seller with
coincident wants is extremely unlikely. She found that these problems re-
duced the probability of trading by about 32%.
Individuals faced with this risk of incomplete trading often turn to bro-
kers who generally claim to be able to find the collection of trades that will
satisfy the bidder’s price point. That is what happened with RECLAIM.
The brokers were more than willing to help, but they charged 40% on each
side of a trade, did not publish their prices, and did not let firms know what
the alternatives in the market really were. They operated dark markets.6
After their experience with brokers, a collection of the firms that had been
deeply involved in the design of RECLAIM came to us and asked that we
consider creating a marketplace that would help them. Without knowing the
language or even the exact concept, what they described as desirable was a
combinatorial exchange. They wanted a transparent market place into which
6A quote from Duffie (2012) shows how pervasive the problem is. “Over-the-counter
(OTC) markets for derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, and repurchase agreements
played a significant role in the global financial crisis. Rather than being traded through
a centralized institution such as a stock exchange, OTC trades are negotiated privately
between market participants who may be unaware of prices that are currently available
elsewhere in the market. In these relatively opaque markets, investors can be in the
dark about the most attractive available terms and who might be offering them. This
opaqueness exacerbated the financial crisis, as regulators and market participants were
unable to quickly assess the risks and pricing of these instruments.” This also happened
in the early years of RECLAIM.
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they could submit bids that expressed their complex needs and willingness-
to-pay and from which they would get fair trades at understandable prices.
The rest of the paper is about the market we built for them.
2 ACE-RECLAIM
The market, designed for RECLAIM, was initially operated under the name
Automated Credit Exchange (ACE). The design was based on research con-
ducted at Caltech in 1993.7 The actual internet-based implementation was
built by a team from Net Exchange that included Takashi Ishikida, Charles
Polk, and Lance Clifner. It utilized an iterated combined-value call market to
trade in quarterly trading sessions. We believe that it was the first internet-
based commercial exchange. ACE-RECLAIM opened in April of 1995 and,
by 1999, it had accounted for approximately 90% of all priced trades in the
RECLAIM market.8
A functioning market has two main pieces: a market mechanism (the
inside piece) and a market process (the outside piece). The inside piece in-
cludes the bid forms, the winner determination algorithm and the pricing
algorithms. The outside piece includes the participation rules, bidding rules,
what is displayed to bidders and when, stopping rules, enforcement rules,
etc. We will first describe the outside piece of the ACE-RECLAIM market.
The market flowed as follows:
• Qualification and escrow
The first step in any market is the qualification of the market par-
ticipants. Since the SCAQMD rules allowed anyone to hold permits
7For a detailed description of the design and experimental test-bedding of the ACE-
RECLAIM mechanism, see Ishikida et al (2001).
8For more on participation in ACE-RECLAIM, see section 4.1.
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and therefore to trade them, anyone was allowed to participate in the
market. But combinatorial markets create a problem that separated
markets do not. Trades are likely to be multi-lateral and complex. This
means that if anyone defaults by not delivering cash or permits at the
end of the process, then many winners may find their trades invali-
dated. To avoid this unfortunate outcome, ACE-RECLAIM required
any participant to provide in escrow, before the market opened, the
cash they would be willing to spend and the permits they were willing
to sell. ACE-RECLAIM then used these data to provide constraints
on the bids the bidders were allowed to make. In particular, no bidder
could bid in a way that would violate the cash and permit bounds,
no matter what bids were accepted. This removed the possibility of
default.
• Bid submission
Bids were submitted in two ways: either online, through a custom
Windows bidding interface on a computer connected via a modem to
the ACE-RECLAIM computer, or via fax to the market manager who
would then input the bids herself.
• Provisional winners, prices, and payments.
After bids are submitted, the ACE-RECLAIM computer calculated
provisional winners, prices, and payments using the market mechanism
described in section 3.
• Stopping Rule, Resubmissions, and the Improvement Rule
ACE-RECLAIM was run as an iterative process. It proceeded in
rounds. At the end of each round (once provisional winners, prices, and
payments were announced) a stopping rule is calculated. The stopping
rule for ACE-RECLAIM was very simple: (a) there must be at least
12
3 rounds, (b) after round 2, if surplus and volume do not increase by
at least 5% from the previous round, the market will end, and (c) the
market will end after round 5 if (b) has not taken place. If the rule is
satisfied, the process goes to Clearance and Settlement to finish up.
If the rule is not satisfied, the process returns to allow more bids. There
are two features of ACE-RECLAIM that come into play at this point.
All winning bids must be re-submitted as they are. They can then be
improved on. Improvement can happen in several ways. Without going
into too much detail, improvement usually means (a) for a bid to buy,
a higher willingness to pay is entered or (b) for a bid to sell, a lower
willingness to accept is entered.
Remark 1 ACE can also be run as a one-shot sealed bid or a con-
tinuous mechanism. Each such version can be used with a variety of
stopping rules, e.g. based on eligibility and activity similar to the FCC’s
SMR rules or based on the increase in surplus over the last round (e.g.
stop if less than 5%).
• Sunshine
An important aspect of combinatorial trading is that often bids of sev-
eral individuals have to fit together, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, in
order for them to trade. Thus it is often important to know what
others are willing to trade or to show others what you are willing to
trade. ACE-RECLAIM allowed individual bidders to choose how much
of their own bids would be made public. They could choose (a) nothing,
(b) quantities of permits only, or (c) quantities of permits and dollar
amounts bid. This was called, respectively, (a) no sunshine, (b) partial
sunshine, and (c) sunshine. ACE-RECLAIM is an iterative process and
many bidders chose (a) in early rounds and (b) or (c) in later rounds
as they became more desperate to find a match of some kind.
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• Clearance and Settlement
Once the stopping rule comes into play, ACE-RECLAIM takes the re-
sults of the last round and implements these: sending orders to the
RECLAIM database for the appropriate reallocation of permits and
sending orders to the escrow holder for the appropriate reallocation of
cash between accounts.
3 ACE
ACE is the market mechanism (the inside piece) for ACE-RECLAIM. ACE
is an acronym for Approximate Competitive Equilibrium, the philosophy be-
hind the market mechanism design. It is a generalization of the well-know
Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA) which produces high efficiencies in
simple markets.9 UPDA is usually run like a sealed bid auction. Subjects
submit bids (P,Q). If Q > 0, it is a buy order to be read as “I will buy
up to Q units of the good for any price less than or equal to P”. If Q < 0
then it is a sell order to be read as “I am willing to sell up to Q units of the
good for any price greater than or equal to P”. After all bids are submitted,
UPDA picks winners by choosing that set of trades that would maximize the
reported surplus. The price at which all transactions take place is the mid-
point between the marginal units (both accepted and rejected). All winning
buyers pay less than (sellers receive more than) or equal to their bid. It is
the same price for all, there is no subsidy or tax for the market, and there is
a strong incentive to reveal one’s true willingness-to-pay (or accept) except
at margin. Since the probability that any bid is marginal can be very low,
this gives ACE a serious shot at being virtually incentive compatible.
9See Smith et.al. (1982), Friedman (1993), and McCabe et. al. (1993).
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Since the ACE market mechanism is to operate in a world that is more
complex than UPDA was designed for, the bid structure, winners determina-
tion, and price determination pieces all had to be modified. The mechanism
allows bidders to submit contingent orders. The winners determination algo-
rithm then maximizes reported surplus, as in UPDA. The pricing algorithm
approximates the UPDA price rule but still leaves bidders as well off after as
if they had not participated.
3.1 Bids
The mechanism allows bidders to submit contingent orders. These can be
ANDs (I want A if and only if I can also secure B) or ORs (I want either A
or B).
Participants submit bids that are numbered i = 1, ..., N .
3.1.1 AND Bids
The basic bid of ACE is an AND bid. It allows a bidder to express interest
in a collection of complements, all of which are needed. An AND bid is in-
tended to protect the bidder from exposure in situations like Example 1.
Definition 1 A simple AND bid numbered i is (bi, xi, F i) where bi ∈ <, xi ∈
<K, and F i ∈ [0, 1]. K is the number of commodities.
The bid is read as “ I will pay up to bif i for the vector xif i as long as
F i ≤ f i ≤ 1”.
The vector xi ∈ <K contains the quantities offered or demanded, where
K is the number of commodities. If xik > 0, then x
i
k units are demanded.
If xik < 0, then x
i
k units are offered for sale. It is not required that all x
i
k
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be positive or negative, i.e. swaps are allowed. The number bi ∈ < is the
maximum amount the bidder is willing to pay for xi. (|bi| is the minimum
amount a seller is willing to sell for if bi < 0.) The number F i ∈ [0, 1] is the
minimum fill number.
When F i = 0, the bid is similar to a (P,Q) bid in a uniform price auc-
tion where bidders are willing to accept any amount q ≤ Q at a payment
t ≤ Pq. F i > 0, indicates a minimum fill requirement which introduces non-
convexities and discontinuities into the design problem. This is the most
challenging part of the ACE design. When F i > 0, the simple UPDA ap-
proach won’t work, particularly the pricing.
Example 3 (Minimum Fill required #1)
Consider a market with a single commodity labeled A, with 1 buyer and
3 sellers. Buyer 1 is willing to pay 20 for 3 units but does not want to pay
anything if he gets less than 3 units. That is, he requires his order be filled
at the 100% level or not at all.
Bidder $ Amount of A % fill required
1 24 3 100
2 - 2 - 1 0
3 - 4 -1 0
4 - 10 -1 0
Gains from trade are maximized if all 4 participate in the deal. Even
though bidder 4 requires $10 per unit and bidder 1 is only willing to pay $8
per unit, bidder 4 makes the deal possible for bidders 2 and 3 and should be
included.
The minimum fill requirement creates several problems here. First, if 1
bids $8 per unit, 4 will never trade and 1 will not get the 3 units he wants.
Second, if 1 agrees to pay 4 any amount greater than $10, both 2 and 3 would
want the same deal. But then 1 cannot afford to pay every one at the rate of
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$10/unit. Often this configuration of values and desires will lead to no trade.
The $8 in potential gains from trade is lost.
A standard thin market has difficulty dealing with minimum fill require-
ments. In the above example, the standard market makes it difficult to
include Bid 4 in the final allocation even though it should be. In our next
example, the standard market makes it difficult to exclude someone from the
final allocation even though they should be.
Example 4 (Minimum Fill required #2)
In this example, there is an additional buyer and Seller 4 has a lower
reservation price.
Bidder $ Amount of A % fill required
1 24 3 100
2 - 2 - 1 0
3 - 4 -1 0
4 - 6 -1 0
5 10 1 0
Here the allocation that maximizes the gains from trade would include
1,2,3, and 4 and exclude 5. The price would probably be somewhere between
6 and 8. But 5 is more than willing to pay upto $10 and so might work hard
to be included in the allocation. In fact, at that proposed price, 5 could offer 2
a deal. 5 can offer to buy 2’s unit for $9. There is no price at which 5 is not
willing to buy and 1 is willing to buy. Often this configuration of values and
desires will lead to a single trade between 1 and 5 yielding a surplus of $8.
Whereas the maximum surplus possible is $12. Potential gains from trade
are lost.
3.1.2 OR bids
An OR bid allows a bidder to express interest in a collection of substitutable
possibilities. An OR bid is intended to protect a bidder from exposure in
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situations like Example 2.
Definition 2 An OR bid numbered i is {(bij, xij, F ij)}Jij=1.
The bid is read as “I will accept one and only one j ∈ Ji in which case I will
pay up to bijf ij as long as f ij ∈ [0, 1].” If Ji = 1, then this is exactly the
same as the AND in section 3.1.1.
Each (bij, xij, F ij) is a simple AND bid. An OR bid requires that, at
most, only one of these be accepted. That means there are δij,∀j ∈ Ji such
that f ij ∈ [δijF ij, δij],∑j δij ≤ 1, and δij ∈ {0, 1}.
3.1.3 Characteristic Bids
A special OR was designed for ACE-RECLAIM to give environmental engi-
neers a user-friendly way of expressing interest and value over a wide range of
substitutable possibilities. Here we provide a slightly more general version.
As we described in Section 1.2, the environmental engineer has a vector of
permits w ∈ <K+ and wants to cover a stream of pollution e ∈ <T+. The
engineer needs to buy a vector of assets x such that xk + wk =
∑
t zkt,∀k,
and
∑
k aktzkt ≥ et,∀t. And, if they want to avoid short sales, they would
add the constraint that xi + wi ≥ 0.
The characteristic bid generalizes the OR bid to allow an infinite variety
of possible satisfactory trades to be considered without exposing the bidder
to the risk of having more than one of those options active at a time.
Definition 3 A characteristic bid numbered i is (bi, Ai, ei, wi, F i).
A characteristic bid is to be read as “I will accept one trade xi as long as
Aitzt ≥ f ieit, xi +wi =
∑
t zt, x
i +wi ≥ 0, and f i ∈ [F i, 1] in which case I will
18
pay up to f ibi for it.
If F i = 1, then the characteristic bid lets the market know that the engi-
neer will buy any combination of assets x as long (i) as she can add them to
her endowment w in a way that covers e and (ii) it costs her no more than
her abatement costs, $B. She leaves it to the market to decide what works.
If F i = 0, then the engineer is also allowing the market to consider
buying her endowment w as long as she is paid at least $0. If there are prices
p then I would want to agree to that trade if and only if (0,−wi) solved
max(f i,xi) f
ibi − pxi subject to Aitzt ≥ f ieit, xi + wi =
∑
t zt, x
i + wi ≥ 0, and
f i ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, letting f i = 1, this means that she would agree to
the trade if and only if pw ≥ $B − P where P solves (1). As we will see
below, the ACE market mechanism algorithms are designed with exactly this
in mind.
Remark 2 A characteristic bid is a generalization of a simple bid. Suppose
(b, x, F ) is a simple bid. Consider the characteristic bid (B,A, e, w,G) :=
(b, I, x, 0, F ). This bid agrees to pay up to fb for any y such that y ≥ fx.
Since y = fx is the dominant possibility this is just another form of a simple
bid.
3.2 Winners Determination
Once all bids are submitted, a winners determination algorithm determines
what trades will be matched and implemented. For ACE, winners are de-
termined by maximizing the ”reported surplus” of the trades subject to the
restrictions imposed by the bidders and subject to no excess demand.
Definition 4 (Winners Determination)
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Let S = { AND bids}. Let O = { OR bids}. Let Z = { characteristic
bids}. The winner determination problem is:
S = max
(f,y)
∑
i∈S∪Z
bif i +
∑
i∈O
∑
j∈Ji
bijf ij (2)
subject to
f i ∈ {0} ∪ [F i, 1] for all i ∈ S ∪ Z (3)
Aitz
i
t ≥ f ieit, xi + wi =
∑
t
zit, x
i + wi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ Z (4)
f ij ∈ [δijF ij, δij], δij ∈ {0, 1},
∑
j∈Ji
δij ≤ 1 all j ∈ Ji, all i ∈ O (5)∑
i∈S
xikf
i +
∑
i∈Z
xik +
∑
i∈O
∑
j∈Ji
xijk f
ij ≤ 0, k ∈ K. (6)
(3) is the minimum fill requirement for all bids except ORs. (4) is the restric-
tion placed by characteristic bids. (5) is the restriction placed by OR bids.
(6) is the requirement that there be no excess demand. In the RECLAIM
ACE market, if
∑
xif i < 0 at the optimum, the transactions were made and
the un-transacted credits were retired. That is, free disposal was possible for
the market. We retain that feature here.
Remark 3 For ease of computation, the algorithm actually split the mar-
ket into disjoint segments (no overlapping bids). This also aided the price
computations which we pick up in the next section.
Remark 4 Maximizing surplus is not the only rule one might use. For ex-
ample, if one is interested in extracting revenue from the mechanism, then
maximizing surplus is rarely the best strategy. But for now we stay with
surplus maximization.
We will need to identify winners and losers as we proceed.
Definition 5 Let (f ∗, y∗) be the values that solve (2) and let f ∗i :=
∑
j∈Ji f
∗ij
for each i ∈ O. The set of winners is denoted by W = {i|f ∗i > 0}. The set of
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losers is denoted by L = {i|f ∗i = 0}. Those winners for whom 0 < f ∗i < 1
will be referred to as marginal winners.
3.3 Pricing
ACE pricing is about (a) providing useful signals to the market that reflect
aggregate demand and supply, (b) not extracting any revenue, (c) achieving
some measure of incentive compatibility, and (d) not rewarding inflexible bid-
ders (i.e. those for whom allowing f i = 0 in (2) would increase the surplus).
Ideally, all of this can be accomplished if we can find competitive equilib-
rium prices that support the allocation found by the winners determination
problem.
3.3.1 Competitive Equilibrium Prices
Competitive equilibrium allocations and prices satisfy two conditions: (i)
each individual’s allocation is just what they would want to buy at those
prices and (ii) there is no excess demand. For ACE, the bids are the indi-
viduals. We want prices that support the winners determination allocation
as a competitive equilibrium. They satisfy ex-post self-selection, or incentive
compatibility, for the bidders.10
For simple bids, competitive equilibrium prices pi would satisfy bi−pixi ≥
0 if i ∈ W and bi − pixi ≤ 0 if i ∈ L. For other bids, things are a little more
complex.
For OR bids, let f ∗ij > 0 in the winners determination solution; that is,
j is the winning part of the OR. f ∗ik = 0, for all k 6= j. Prices pi would be
regret-free if (a) bij − pixij ≥ 0 and bij − pixij = 0 if 0 < f ∗ij < 1 and (b)
bik − pixik ≤ bijf ∗ij − pixijf ∗ij for all k 6= j. Note that if ij is a winner with
10These are also sometimes called no arbitrage or no re-contracting constraints.
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f ∗ij = 1, this does not require ik to be a loser (i.e. bik − pixik < 0) only that
it not be as good as ij at those prices. It does imply that if
∑
j∈Ji f
∗ij = 0,
then all the Ji bids should be losers at the prices pi.
For characteristic bids, let the solution to the winners determination prob-
lem (2) be (f ∗i, x∗i). Prices would be regret-free if bif ∗i − pix∗i ≥ bif i − pixi
for all xi such that Aitzt ≥ f ieit, xi + wi =
∑
t zt, x
i + wi ≥ 0, f i ∈ [F i, 1].
Remark 5 For RECLAIM Zone free bids, the restriction to regret-free prices
was implemented with the constraint that the inland price be less than or equal
to the coastal price. Because inland credits could not be used to cover coastal
emissions, it imposed a simple requirement on the prices of the two zones
no matter what year-cycle is involved. Only the inland firms care about the
relative prices. If the coastal price is less than the inland price, inland firms
would want to only buy coastal credits, thus driving the price up. If the inland
price is less than the coastal price, the coastal firms could not drive the inland
price up. No-regret prices are also arbitrage-free prices.
The no-arbitrage conditions are:
• If there are k, k′, l, i such that aiklaik′l > 0, X
i
k > 0, and X
i
k′ > 0, then
pbk = p
b
k′.
• If there are k, k′, l, i such that aiklaik′l > 0, X
i
k > 0, and X
i
k′ = 0, then
pbk ≤ pbk′.
• If there are k, k′, l, i such that aiklaik′l > 0, X
i
k < 0, and X
i
k′ < 0, then
psk = p
s
k′.
• If there are k, k′, l, i such that aiklaik′l > 0, X
i
k < 0, and X
i
k′ = 0, then
psk ≥ psk′.
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If the pb and ps did not satisfy these then X
i
would not be a cost-minimizing
coverage of ei at those prices.
Definition 6 (competitive equilibrium prices)
Let (f ∗, x∗, δ∗) be the values of f that solve the winner determination
problem (2).11 Competitive equilibrium prices, pi, satisfy the following:
f ∗i(bi − pi · xi) ≥ f i(bi − pi · xi) for all f i ∈ [F i, 1], i ∈ S (7)∑
j∈Ji
f ∗ij(bij − pixij) ≥
∑
j∈Ji
f ij(bij − pixij) for all f i, δi such that (8)∑
j∈Ji
δij ≤ 1, f ij ∈ [δijF ij, δij], δij ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ O
f ∗ibi − pix∗i ≥ f ibi − pixi for all (f i, xi) such that (9)
f i ∈ [F i, 1], Aitzit ≥ f ieit, xi + wi =
∑
t
zit, x
i + wi ≥ 0, for all i, i ∈ Z,
pi · [
∑
i∈S
xif ∗i +
∑
i∈Z
x∗i +
∑
i∈O
∑
j∈Ji
xijf ∗ij] = 0. (10)
pik ≥ 0 for all k. (11)
(7) - (9) are the regret-free conditions on bidders. They require that ex post
each bid is allocated in a way that maximizes the bid’s surplus at those
prices subject to the bid’s restrictions. (10) is Walras Law which requires
that pik = 0 when there is an excess supply of k. These conditions, along
with no excess demand (6) from the winners determination problem, imply
that the winners determination allocation and the prices pi are a competitive
equilibrium for the economy described by the bids.
There are two possible problems at this point. Competitive equilibrium
prices may not exist. And, even if they do exist, they may not be unique.
11x∗ is relevant for characteristic bids. δ∗ is relevant for OR bids. f∗ is relevant for all
types of bids.
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Non-uniqueness: If (2) is convex, prices satisfying (7) -(11) exist.12 The
dual variables of the linear-programming problem will serve as these prices.
But they may not be unique. There are 2 reasons.
One, in a thin market when a package matches another package, the range
of prices satisfying no-regret can be wide. Consider the following example.
Example 5 (Opposing swaps)
There are 2 AND bids.
Bid $ Amount of A Amount of B
1 3 1 -1
2 -3 -1 1
Bid 1 indicates, for example, that some one is willing to pay 3 to swap 1
unit of B for 1 unit of A. In this case, pA and pB are not separately identified
and all we can conclude is that pA− pB = 3. This is not a problem, since no
bidder cares which particular price vector is selected from those.
Two, the bounds in definition 6 may not be tight. This occurs for exam-
ple if there is no marginal winner.
Example 6 (Single asset - No marginal winner)
Bid $ Amounts $/unit
1 500 500 1
2 -400 -500 0.8
For this example, any price between $0.80 and $1 will be a competitive
equilibrium price. This is a problem, because the price selected determines
the distribution of the surplus among buyers and sellers.
12Since (2) maximizes surplus, and “preferences” are quasi-linear, the winners allocation
is Pareto-optimal. We can therefore apply the second welfare theorem to establish the
existence of prices supporting that allocation.
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To deal with non-uniqueness in prices, ACE chooses the prices that max-
imize the winning bidders’ minimum per-unit surplus. This is the intuitive
equivalent to Myerson-Satterthwaite’s (1983) k-double auction when k = 1/2.
It equalizes the per-unit surplus between buyers and sellers on the margin.
In example 6, ACE will set the price to $0.9.
Non-existence: Non-existence is way more serious than non-uniqueness.
The prime cause of the non-existence of equilibrium prices is inflexibility due
to a minimum fill requirement. In this section, we show how the inflexibility
causes the non-existence through examples and discuss how it is resolved.
For simplicity, the examples are set in a single asset market.
Example 7 (Excess supply at winners determination)
In this example, it is possible to find a regret-free price at the winners
determination allocation but payments will not balance.
Bid $ Amount Min. scale(%) $/unit
1 2500 2000 0 1.25
2 500 500 0 1.00
3 -1500 -3000 100 0.50
If all orders were flexible, a competitive equilibrium would exist at the
price of $0.5 per unit and 500 units of order 3 would not trade. Because
of the sell order’s inflexibility, the market must absorbs 500 units of excess
supply. But, because of this imbalance between the amounts bought and the
amounts sold, no single price will allow balance of all payments and charges.
With inflexibility someone must pay for this extra 500 units, or no trade will
occur.
In Example 7, if the extra 500 units were not taken by the market maker,
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no trade would occur. So it is not unreasonable to have Bids 1 and 2 pay
for it. A natural way to do that, while preserving some measure of incentive
compatibility, is to charge buyers a higher price than is paid to sellers. To
implement that, we would charge each buy unit at $0.8181 and pay each
sell unit at $0.68182. But this rewards the inflexibility of Bid 3. If they
were perfectly flexible, they would gain a surplus of 0 and get only 2500
units. If they are inflexible and we used this pricing scheme, they would get
3000 · $0.18182 = $545.476. An alternative would be to pay B3 at what she
bid, $0.50/unit, and charge the buyers $1.20. But this punishes not only the
inflexible part of Bid 1 but also the flexible part. A better alternative is to
pay the inflexible part (500 units) at $0.50 and then split the prices in a way
that equalizes the per-unit surplus at the margin. In Example 7, this would
mean each buyer would be charged $0.80 and the seller would be paid $0.70
for the 2500 flexible units and $0.50 for the 500 inflexible units. ACE does
something similar to this.
Example 8 (Excess supply from AND bid)
In this example, we illustrate another way in which a single price can be
found to satisfy no-regret but will not balance payments. There are no mini-
mum fill requirements here.
Bid $ Amount of A Amount of B
1 - 100 50 - 30
2 300 25 10
3 -100 - 75
4 100 10
All these bids will win in the winners determination problem. But there
will be an excess supply of 10 units of of B. It is easy to find prices that
satisfy no-regret for all bids. For example, pa = 2, pb = 9 will do the job. But
because there is an excess supply, the market will absorb the 10 units and, as
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in example 7, someone will have to pay the $9 · 10 = $90 to Bid 1.
ACE will deal with this by splitting the buy and sell prices and then choosing
them so as to equalize the minimum per unit surplus across orders.
Example 9 (Incompatible surplus requirements)
In this example it is not even possible to find a regret-free price at the
winners determination allocation.
Order $ Amount Min. scale(%) $/unit
1 2000 2000 100 1.00
2 -425 -500 0 0.85
3 -980 -1000 0 0.98
4 -525 -500 0 1.05
Sell order 4 is allocated because buy order 1 is an all-or-none order and
there is enough surplus from the part of trade made among orders 1,2, and
3 to compensate for the surplus loss resulting from matching a part of order
1’s demand and sell order 4. Without order 4 no trades will occur so 4 is
included in the winners determination allocation.
Since sell order 4 asks more per unit than buy order 1 bids per unit, no
single price can satisfy no-regret for both 4 and 1. For allocations in these
examples, individual prices will have to be charged to some bids in order
to satisfy no-regret. One option is to pay 4 what they bid, $525, and then
split the buy and sell prices for the others to pay that. Since Order 1 is
inflexible, they would pay $1 per unit (as in example 7 we don’t want to
reward inflexibility) while Orders 2 and 3 would be paid $0.9833 per unit.
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3.3.2 The ACE pricing algorithm
As we found out in the previous section, allowing bids that are able to express
bidders’ preferences opens up the possibility that competitive equilibrium
prices will not exist. So one must settle for something less. In this section,
we describe how ACE handles this.
We want prices that (a) provide useful signals to the market that reflect
aggregate demand and supply, (b) do not extract or inject any revenue into
the process, (c) achieve some measure of incentive compatibility, and (d) do
not reward inflexible bidders. ACE accomplishes (a) by finding prices that
are “as close as possible” to competitive equilibrium prices, accomplishes (b)
by requiring payments and receipts to add up to zero, accomplishes (c) by
ignoring losing bids13 and choosing prices between all marginal winning bids
(a double auction approach), and accomplishes (d) by paying inflexible bids
at exactly what they bid.
ACE first identifies those inflexible bids or parts of those bids that pre-
vent regret free prices from existing, as for example Bid 4 in Example 9.
Those inflexible bids are set aside and will be paid or pay at what they bid.
There is now a price that is regret-free for the remaining bids. Unfortunately,
payments may not balance at that price, as happens in Example 7. So ACE
then splits the prices into a price vector for buyers, pb, and a price vector for
sellers, ps, and searches for a pair that (i) satisfy no-regret for the remaining
bids (or parts of bids), (ii) maximize the minimum per unit surplus for all
13In a thick market, losing bids can be used to drive incentive compatibility by leading
winning bids to reveal their true values. In thin markets, losing bids can be used to
manipulate prices and detract from incentive compatibility. Since ACE is designed for
thin markets (it is not needed in thick markets), ACE ignores the losing bids from the
winners determination problem (2) when determining prices. ACE ignores both losing
simple bids (those with f i = 0) and the losing parts of OR bids (those with f ij = 0).
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of the remaining bids, and (iii) balance payments and receipts of all bids
(including those set aside).
Step 1: Ignore losing bids and the losing parts of OR bids.
Begin with the allocation (f ∗, y∗) from the winners determination prob-
lem (2). Let I ⊂ I be the set of allocated orders, (those i ∈ S ∪ Z with
f ∗i > 0 and those i ∈ O with f ∗ij > 0 ). Let S = S⋂ I, Z = Z⋂ I, let
O = O⋂ I. For i ∈ S ∪ Z, Bi = f ∗ibi. For i ∈ O, Bi = bi∑j∈Ji f ∗ijbij. For
i ∈ S, X i = f ∗ixi. For i ∈ O, X i = ∑j∈Ji f ∗ijxij. For i ∈ Z, X i = y∗i, and
ei = f ∗iei.
Step 2: Determine which units are extra-marginal.
To determine those parts of the winning bids that are inflexible, ACE
solves the following fully flexible winners determination problem.
max
(g,x)
∑
i∈I B
i
gi
subject to |xi| ≤ |X i|, i ∈ Z
Aitz
i
t ≥ giei, xi + wi =
∑
t z
i
t, x
i + wi ≥ 0, i ∈ O∑
i∈S∪O g
iX
i
k +
∑
i∈Z x
i
k ≤ 0, k ∈ K (12)
0 ≤ gi ≤ 1, i ∈ I
Let (g, y) be the solution of (12). The inflexible part of bid i is (1−gi)X i
for i ∈ S ∪ O, and is X i − yi for i ∈ Z.14 ACE sets this part of these
orders aside. They will be filled and they will pay (1 − gi)Bi. Prices on
14A characteristic bid may not be itself inflexible but a part of it may be matching an
inflexible part of another bid.
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the rest of the orders, called the fully flexible orders, will have to “pay” for
D =
∑
i∈I(1− gi)B
i
. This usually requires that prices be split into buy and
sell prices.
Step 3: Find a vector of buy prices and a vector of sell prices that is regret-
free for as many of the fully flexible orders as possible, that balances all pay-
ments, and maximizes the minimum surplus per order.
Let G := {i ∈ I|gi > 0} and D := ∑i∈I(1 − gi)Bi. G is the set of bids
with a fully-flexible component. D is the contribution to the total payment
from the units paying at their bid/ask prices.
For any vector y, let y+ := (max{0, y1},max{0, y2}, ...,max{0, yK}) and
y− := (min{0, y1},min{0, y2}, ...,min{0, yK}). X i+k is the amount of asset k
potentially bought at the market (buy) price, and |X i−k | is the amount of
asset k potentially sold at the market (sell) price.
Solve the following pricing problem.
max
(m,pb,ps)
m (13)
subject to
pbX
i+
+ psX
i−
+mi
∑
k∈K
|X ik| = Bi, i ∈ G (14)
pbgiX
i+
+ psgiX
i− ≤ pbyi+ + psyi−, for all yi such that
Aitz
i
t ≥ gieit, yi + wi =
∑
t
zit ≥ 0, i ∈ G ∩ Z (15)∑
i∈G\(G∩Z)
(pbgiX
i+
+ psgiX
i−
) +
∑
i∈G∩Z
(pbxi+ + psxi−) +D = 0, (16)
mi ≥ m, i ∈ G
pbk ≥ psk ≥ 0, k ∈ K
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In (14), mi is the per-unit surplus that this bid will receive if the prices are
(pb, ps). To be precise, each of the terms in (14) should be multiplied by
gi, but, since they all just cancel, we are leaving them out. The regret-free
condition for all bids is contained in (14) when mi ≥ 0. (15) is the regret-
free condition for i ∈ Z. It should be noted that the complete statement is
giB
i−gi(pb, ps) ·(X i+, X i−) ≥ giBi−(pb, ps) ·(yi+, yi−). But the giBi cancels
out. Finally, (16) is the requirement that all payments and receipts balance.
Remark 6 Note that (15), as well as (19) below, really involves an infinite
number of constraints that define a convex set. As pointed out in Remark 5,
for the RECLAIM implementation we were able to convert (15) to a finite
set of constraints on the prices. Each application requires its own conversion.
We do not have a general approach to accomplishing that.
If there is no inflexibility, then D = 0, and pb = ps in the solution to (13).
That is, a competitive equilibrium price will be found.
Step 4: Check to see if appropriate prices have been found. If not, set aside
more bids and repeat.
A) If the value of the objective function of (13) is nonnegative, ACE
is done with this phase. ACE then enters into a clearance and settlement
phase, determining what is allocated to each bid and how much they pay or
are paid. We describe that process in Section 3.3.3.
B) If the value of the objective function of (13) is negative, then an ap-
propriate market price system does not exist because there is not enough
surplus at the margin to pay for the inflexible parts of the winning bids.15
15This would be the case, for example, if Bid 2 in Example 7 were $275 for 500 units or
$0.55 per unit.
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In this case, ACE chooses some more units/orders to set aside and to pay at
their bid/ask prices and then recomputes. This iterates until ACE finds an
appropriate market price system for those bids that have not been set aside.
After the t-th iteration, there are two sets of orders. Gt is the set of the
orders which have been set aside and which will pay at their bid. An order
in Gt is (B
i, Y i). Ht is the set of orders, or parts of orders, which have not
yet been set aside. There are two types of orders in Ht: simple orders and
cycle-zone free orders (Bi, Y i) and characteristic orders (Bi, Ai, Ei, wi). H0
is set to be G.
At the t+ 1-st iteration, we solve
max
(m,pb,ps)
m
subject to
pbY i+ + psY i− +mi
∑
k∈K
|Y ik | = Bi, i ∈ Ht (17)
pbY i+ + psY i− = Bi, i ∈ Gt (18)
pbY i+ + psY i− ≥ pbyi+ + psyi−, for all yi such that
Aitz
i
t ≥ gieit, yi + wi =
∑
t
zit ≥ 0, i ∈ Ht ∩ Z (19)∑
i∈Ht\(Ht∩Z)
(pbY i+ + psY i−) +
∑
i∈Ht∩Z
(pbyi+ + psyi−) +
∑
i∈Gt
Bi = 0, (20)
mi ≥ m, i ∈ Ht
pbk ≥ psk ≥ 0, k ∈ K
If the value of the objective function is nonnegative, then ACE is done with
the pricing computation and goes to clearance and settlement (see Section
3.3.3). If the value of the objective function is negative, then the orders
that attain the minimum per unit surplus among the orders in Ht are now
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removed from Ht and added to Gt to get Ht+1 and Gt+1.
16
If Ht+1 is empty, the surplus distribution is determined and ACE goes to
clearance and settlement.17 Otherwise ACE repeats Step 4.
3.3.3 Payments
When the ACE pricing algorithm is finished, there are two sets of orders, Gt
and Ht, and two market price vectors, p
b and ps. The orders in Gt will pay
what they bid. The orders in Ht will pay at the market prices.
16 We perform an extra step to determine the orders that are truly attaining the mini-
mum per unit surplus. The step is necessary because of the non-uniqueness of prices; at
some prices more orders can attain the minimum surplus than at other prices.
Let Wt be the value of the objective function of LP (17). Let H
min
t be the set of orders
whose per unit surplus wjs are found equal to Wt. Then solve the following LP for each
j in Hmint .
max wj
sub. to wi ≥Wt, i ∈ Hmint ,
all the constraints in (17)
If the value of the objective function of the above is Wt, order j is considered attaining
the minimum per unit surplus at the t-th iteration.
17There still is a chance that the price is not uniquely determined after the surplus
distribution is determined because bids are as in Example 5. In such a case we choose
prices that support the surplus distribution and are averaged. Suppose a buy order of
$1000 for 500 units each of items A and B matches a sell order of $900 for 500 units each
of items A and B. The per unit surplus of each order is $0.5. This surplus distribution
can be achieved, for example, (pA = $19, pB = $0). We choose (pA = pB = $9.5). This
‘averaging’ is often consistent to the reference price information made available to traders
in early round when there was no trade because asking prices by sellers are higher than
bid prices by buyers. Suppose the buyer’s bid is $900 and the seller’s ask is $1000 in the
example in this footnote. If there are no other orders involving assets A and B in the
market, $0.9 is returned as the highest average bid price for both assets A and B and $1.0
is returned as the lowest average ask price for A and B.
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3.3.4 A computational note
The pricing algorithm took the split of the markets18 further after removing
losing bids (losing bids can overlap with winning ones and the removal can
allow further division). This occurred between Steps 1 and 2. This was done
to limit the number of bids that have to pay the deficit from the ’pay-as-you-
bid’ portion of allocation and as a consequence of the decision not to impose
arbitrage-free conditions on losing bids.
4 The Performance of ACE in RECLAIM
Although there have been many papers assessing the performance of RE-
CLAIM,19 ACE has been mostly invisible20 because those assessments were
aimed at the performance of RECLAIM and not at the performance of the
markets themselves.
In this section, we will examine the performance of the ACE market in the
RECLAIM program for the period from 1996 to 2000.21 The ACE data ex-
plored in this section cover the markets from April 1996 to January of 2000.22
There are two main reasons for choosing this time period. First, this is the
period covered in Fine (2001). Second, it is the historically relevant period.
RECLAIM began in late 1993. In the beginning, there were several avenues
18See Remark 3.
19See, for example, Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2012), Fromm and Hansjurgens (1996),
McCann (1996), and Thompson (2000).
20The exceptions are Klier et.al. (1997), written before the first ACE market, and Fine
(2001).
21This section draws heavily on Chapter 4 of Fine (2001) who had access to the ACE
data from Net Exchange.
22Markets were held at-least quarterly, with some years having 5 or 6 markets. Specif-
ically, the data are from the following auctions: April 1996, July 1996, August 1996,
October 1996, February 1997, April 1997, July 1997, October 1997, January 1998, April
1998, July 1998, October 1998, January 1999, April 1999, July 1999, August 1999, October
1999, and January 2000.
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for trading but the main ones were a bulletin board run by the SCAQMD
and semi-annual auctions run by the brokerage firm Cantor-Fitzgerald. ACE
began in April 1996. In 2001, the California electricity market crisis caused
serious disruptions in the operations of RECLAIM and by 2000 ACE had
been sold by Net Exchange to Aeon. At that point the ACE data become
suspect.23
To assess the performance of ACE in RECLAIM, we will examine the
participation, bidding and pricing behavior exhibited by the participants in
ACE market.
4.1 Participation
Over time more and more of the members of RECLAIM universe used ACE
markets. In Figure 1, we show the number of bidders and winners partic-
ipating in ACE markets from 1996 to 2000. Even though the number of
RECLAIM facilities did not dramatically changed over this time period, the
number of bidders and winners in the ACE markets increased yearly. In 1996
only 10% of RECLAIM members conducted trades through ACE. By 1999,
20% did. By 2000, the number increased to about 30%.
Even more dramatically, by 2000 the ACE market had accounted for
approximately 90% of all trades-for-a-price24 in the RECLAIM market. In
1999, RECLAIM recorded 239 trades-for-a-price (219 in the NOx market and
20 in the SOx market). ACE conducted 213 of these trades, 208 of which
were for NOx permits. That means 95% of all serious NOx trades went
through the ACE markets.
As the RECLAIM program progressed, environmental engineers learned
23For more on this, see section 4.4 below.
24We are only interested in trades for a price, since zero price trades are either inter-
facility within a firm or transfers to or from a permit broker, and are therefore not truly
part of the competitive market.
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Figure 1: Participation in the ACE market, by session and year
that the non-ACE trading mechanisms involved extreme transactions costs
relative to the ease and efficiency of the ACE market. They were choosing
the more efficient option.
4.2 Biding Patterns
In each ACE market session, there are over 100 assets available for purchase.
There is a significant stream of futures available to a RECLAIM trader. The
ACE market is a powerful institution, allowing for bids that describe very
complex preferences. Are the bidders using these options, or are the complex
bidding features of the ACE mechanism simply window-trimming? In Figure
2 we display the percentages of package bids submitted and transacted. 18%
of the bids submitted and 14% of the transactions are for packages. This
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seems to be a relatively small use of the combinatorial capability of the ACE
algorithm. But taking a slightly different look at the data gives a deeper
insight.		
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Figure 2: Percentage of bids and fulfilled orders that are for packages
If we consider the RTCs as different assets because the date of effective-
ness is different, we have a very thin data set from which it is difficult to
perceive bidding and pricing patterns. So instead, we consider the RTCs not
as dated objects (in terms of their year of validity) but as a stream of future
contracts dated relative to the current market. In Figure 3, we show the
number of bids and fulfilled orders in the market as a function of the vintage
of the earliest item in the bid.25
25We only consider the spot and futures markets up to 17 permits in the future (for a
total of 9 years of forward contracts in any given trading session).
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Figure 3: Relative vintage of assets in bids and fulfilled orders
Once we make this adjustment and consider the permits in terms of their
relative vintage, a pattern emerges. The number of bids entered is inversely
proportional to the time horizon. Further, looking at Figure 4, it can be
seen that there are really two markets: a spot or short-term and a planning
or long-term market. The bidding patterns in the two markets are in stark
contrast to each other. In the spot market (the earliest vintage currently
available), approximately 91% of the bids are for a single asset. Addition-
ally, there are no swappers at all in the spot market. That is, of those 9%
of bids that are for more than one asset, the bids are either pure buys or
pure sells. This is not unexpected. The spot market is a time for rebalancing
planned with actual emissions. This can be easily done with single asset bids.
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Figure 4: Percent of bids that are packages, by relative vintage
In the longer-term market the bidding is far more frequently for packages.
32% of bids are combined value (for the 72 permits more than 3 years in the
future). This is also not unexpected. The futures market is a place to
evaluate trade-offs between investment in abatement equipment and RTC
acquisition. As we showed in section 1.2, this involves swaps and packages.
The frequency of package bidding in the long-term market is quite similar
to that observed in the experiments discussed in Fine, Bossaerts, Ledyard
(2002). There it was shown that 20-30% package bidding was more than
enough to create the liquidity necessary to allow efficient trading when there
are strong complementarities as there are in RECLAIM.
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4.3 Pricing Patterns
It is important to look separately at two different time trends: how prices
move across ACE markets and how prices move across permit vintages.
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Figure 5: Spot market pricing in ACE markets, April 1996 to April 2000
In Figure 5, we detail the evolution of the NOx and SOx spot ACE
price across ACE markets from April 1996 to January 2000. There is almost
no trade in any of the markets except for NOx Zone 1, so henceforth we
will use the data from this asset to demonstrate the patterns that emerge.
The initial supply of RTCs was in excess of the reported emissions at the
market’s inception in 1994. The supply of RTCs was then reduced each year
and in 1997-98, dipped below the total 1994 emissions level. It is at this
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point, that prices began an uphill climb.26 From July 1997, the spot market
price strictly increased over time. This is because facilities looked down the
road, recognized the impending shortage of RTCs, and began rolling permits
forward. In late 1999, the price of RTCs dramatically increases shortly after
the expected cross of RTC availability and reported emissions. However,
even this highest price falls quite short of the AQMD’s anticipated price of
$11,257 per ton.27
In fact, prices have stayed quite low. Assuming these prices accurately
reflect the marginal abatement costs, it appears that the planning flexibility
offered by the RECLAIM program resulted in lower than expected marginal
control costs, perhaps from the shift to a facility-wide performance stan-
dard28 Additionally, prior to the start of RECLAIM, facilities had incentive
to misrepresent their emissions and true costs of abatement. Indeed the
incentive historically has been to overstate the control costs during public
hearings in order to deflect proposed command-and-control type regulations.
This strategic reporting further accounts for the gap between predicted and
actual RTC prices.
The April 2000 data indicate that prices were now approaching the pre-
dicted levels. The marginal cost of Best Available Control Technology (or
BACT) for NOx was believed to be in the range of $3.50 to $4.50 per pound.
The spot market price for permits in the April 2000 market was $4.23. In
26Why do we observe non-zero prices in the spot market? While the number of RTCs
available across both cycles has historically been in excess of reported emissions, this does
not mean that in any given market there is an excess supply. Firms were either assigned
to Cycle 1 or Cycle 2, and then allocated RTCs. Therefore, it is quite possible that there
may not be enough permits of a given cycle to cover that entire year’s emissions without
benefit of permits from another cycle.
27Johnson and Pekelney (1996) built the Emissions Trading Model (ETM) to assess the
potential economics and environmental impacts of RECLAIM’s emissions trading program.
It estimated trades that were likely to occur under the program and linked them to a
general equilibrium model of the regional economy.
28See Bohi and Burtraw (1997) for an excellent discussion of the impacts on control
costs.
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2000, the RECLAIM program was just reaching the market transition point
that Johnson and Pekelney (1996) believed would occur.
Now let us turn to how prices change across vintages. Again we can see
differences between the short and long-term markets. As Figure 6 shows,
from the spot market to about 7 permits or 3.5 years into the future, the
price of permits increases. Once we look to 4 years in the future and beyond,
the pricing is remarkably stable. The combined-value mechanism, including
its pricing algorithm, provides the liquidity necessary for stable, meaningful
prices in the long-term market. This allows the long-term market to exhibit
the stable pricing many economists feared impossible.29
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Figure 6: Price of NOx Zone 1 RTCs, as a function of relative vintage
29See Hausker (1992).
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4.4 But, Who Will Guard the Guardians?
We cannot leave off our evaluation of ACE-RECLAIM without acknowledg-
ing a serious, practical problem that market designers generally just wave
their hands at.30 How can we keep the operators of the algorithms hon-
est? The post-2000 history of ACE-RECLAIM illustrates the problem. In
1999/2000, Net Exchange, who had developed and run the ACE algorithms,
sold ACE-RECLAIM to Aeon, the company that had handled most of the
back-end details of the auctions, such as marketing, escrowing, etc. Between
2000 and 2004, something went very wrong. In June of 2004, Anne Sholtz,
the president of Aeon was arrested for being in a “scheme to defraud” nu-
merous companies.31 This included trading in front of the bidders and selling
RTCs that had no counter side. She was sentenced in 2008.
The algorithms were fine, trustworthy and reliable; the operator was not.
How to design to protect against such misbehavior remains an open research
question.
4.5 Conclusion
Karl Hausker (1992) eloquently voiced the concerns of many economists of
the time about tradable permit programs such as RECLAIM. He was con-
cerned that the long-term market would suffer from extreme thinness due
to uncertainty, transactions costs, and other sources of market inefficiency.
Although the long-term market does seem to have been thinly traded, the
combined-value market mechanism used in the ACE market overcame this
illiquidity, as predicted in Bossaerts, Fine, and Ledyard (2002). The ACE
market mechanism became, over the first four years of the RECLAIM emis-
30One exception can be found in the Nobel Lecture of Leonid Hurwicz, “But, Who Will
Guard the Guardians?” See Hurwicz (2007). We have adopted his title for this section.
31See LA Times (2004) and Pasadena Weekly (2010).
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sions credit trading program, the market venue of choice for polluting facili-
ties.
The short-term and long-term markets exhibited dramatically different
bidding and pricing patterns. The short-term trader places single-asset bids,
making one-time adjustments to her predicted emissions levels. For the long-
term planner, the combined value market provided clear, stable pricing and
the ability to plan a pollution stream without the risk of attaining only part
of that stream.
Since a single-asset bid is simply a degenerate form of a combined-value
bid, imposing the combined-value structure on the short-term market cer-
tainly did no harm. Indeed, the additional liquidity provided by those few
traders who traded in bundles including both short-term and long-term RTCs
provided an important bridge between the two markets, improving liquidity
in both.
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